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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Petitioner,
Case No. 20040566-SC

vs.
HEATHER JO RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant/Respondent.

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF OF PETITIONER
* * *

STATEMENT OF SUPPLEMENTAL ISSUE
Did the totality of the circumstances justify drawing defendant's
blood without a warrant, where her body had been destroying
evidence of automobile homicide since the accident and would
continue to destroy it while police sought a warrant?
SUPPLEMENTAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE
In its opening brief, the State argued that Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966), and its progeny established what is, for all practical purposes, a per se rule
that the destruction of blood-alcohol evidence in an impaired driver is an exigency
that justifies drawing the driver's blood without a warrant. Br. Pet. at 7-14. The
State also argued, however, that even absent Schmerber and its progeny, the
warrantless blood draw was justified under the traditional totality of the
circumstances test. Br. Pet. at 14-26. Defendant objected to the State's totality of the

circumstances analysis on the ground that it was not fairly included within the
question presented in the writ of certiorari. Br. Resp. at 29.
This Court subsequently amended its writ of certiorari to include review of
the court of appeals' totality of the circumstances test. See Order dated September 6,
2006. The State now supplements the arguments in point B of its Brief of Petitioner
with the following.
SUPPLEMENTAL ARGUMENT
UNDER AN OBJECTIVE VIEW OF THE TOTALITY OF THE
CIRCUMSTANCES, POLICE WERE JUSTIFIED IN DRAWING
DEFENDANT'S BLOOD WITHOUT A WARRANT
The Fourth Amendment guards against "unreasonable" intrusions by the
government into our "persons, houses, papers, and effects." U.S. Const, amend. IV;
Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (noting that Fourth Amendment's
central requirement is "one of reasonableness").

An intrusion is presumed

reasonable when accompanied by a warrant. See McArthur, 531 U.S. at 330.
Warrantless intrusions are also reasonable, however, when justified by "special law
enforcement needs, diminished expectations of privacy, minimal intrusions, or the
like." Id.
Whether a warrantless intrusion is reasonable depends on "all of the
circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search or
seizure itself." United States v. Montoya De Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531,537 (1985). Thus,
2

while exceptions to the warrant requirement are often labeled in neat categories
such as "exigent circumstances" or "the automobile exception," the true test for
reasonableness weighs the competing interests of the government and the
individual based on the facts known to the government agent performing the
search. Id. ("The permissibility of a particular law enforcement practice is judged by
balancing its intrusion on the individuars Fourth Amendment interests against its
promotion of legitimate governmental interests." (citations and quotations
omitted)). When the government's interest in obtaining the evidence without a
warrant outweighs the individuars interest in the privacy of his home, person, or
effects, a warrantless intrusion is reasonable.
In balancing the State's and the suspect's interests in cases involving a bodily
intrusion, the Supreme Court has considered two factors: (1) whether there is an
objectively reasonable belief that that the evidence will be lost before officers can
obtain a warrant, see Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624
(1989); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,770-71 (1966); and (2) whether the State's
interest in obtaining evidence outweighs the suspect's interest in the privacy and

3

security of his body, see Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 763 (1985); Welsh v. Wisconsin,
466 U.S. 740, 753-54 (1984).1
A. Officers reasonably believed that delay to get a warrant
threatened the destruction of evidence.
Courts have repeatedly held that the imminent destruction of evidence is an
exigency that may justify intruding into a protected area without first obtaining a
warrant. See United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31,36 (2003); McArthur, 531 U.S. at 332;
Schmerher, 384 U.S. at 770-71; Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 41^2 (1963); State v.
Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255,1258 (Utah 1987). To prove an exigency, the State need only
demonstrate a reasonable belief that "the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under
the circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence.'" Schmerher, 384 U.S. at
770 (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364,367 (1964)); see also McArthur, 531
U.S. at 332 (upholding warrantless detention because police "reasonably could have
concluded" that McArthur would destroy drugs during time needed to get a
warrant); Banks, 540 U.S. at 36 (holding that police only need reasonable suspicion of
destruction of evidence to forcibly enter home without announcing presence when
serving a warrant). The required level of suspicion is the same as that needed under

1

Of course, officers must also have probable cause. See Schmerher, 384 U.S. at
769. That question was raised by defendant in the court of appeals, but not decided
by that court. See State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, \ 7,93 P.3d 854.
4

Terry v. Ohio to temporarily detain and frisk a person suspected of criminal
activity—reasonable belief. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968) (holding that
officer may stop and frisk suspect when officer "has reason to believe that he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual").
The reasonableness of the belief is determined by considering the totality of
the circumstances objectively from the officer's standpoint. See Ohio v. Robinette, 519
U.S. 33, 39 (1996) ("Reasonableness, in turn, is measured in objective terms by
examining the totality of the circumstances."). Only the objective circumstances are
considered. See Brigham City v. Stuart, 126 S.Ct. 1943,1948 (2006). "The officer's
subjective motivation is irrelevant." Id.
In the instant case, the facts known to the police created an objectively
reasonable belief that "the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the
circumstances, threatened 'the destruction of evidence.'" Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770
(citation omitted). Officers knew that an automobile accident occurred in which it
was suspected that alcohol was involved (R. 559:61; 560:19). By the time they
arrived on the scene, defendant had already been taken to the hospital (R. 560:4).
Officers thus had to investigate the accident and interview witnesses to determine
whether defendant was the driver and was intoxicated when the accident occurred.
During that time, defendant's body metabolism was destroying the evidence of her
intoxication. See Br. Amici at 4-5. Police knew that her body would continue to
5

destroy the evidence until they could secure a sample of her blood. Id. Given that
some of the evidence had already been destroyed, and that the evidence would
continue to be destroyed if officers sought a warrant, officers could reasonably
believe that delay to obtain a warrant "threatened 'the destruction of evidence/" See
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (citation omitted).
The court of appeals nevertheless held that officers did not reasonably believe
that an exigency existed. See State v. Rodriguez, 2004 UT App 198, J 20,93 P.3d 854.
The court's conclusion incorrectly relied, however, on the officer's subjective
motivations. This error is explained in point B.l of the State's Brief of Petitioner.
The court also erred in requiring officers to consider factors such as "the
difficulty and time required to obtain a proper search warrant," "the availability of a
magistrate," and "the proximity of the nearest magistrate." Rodriguez, 2004 UT App
198 at %% 17-20. Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court has ever required
officers faced with the imminent destruction of evidence to consider such questions.
Courts only require a reasonable belief that during the time officers are seeking a
warrant the evidence might be destroyed. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71.
Reasonable belief is "somewhat abstract." United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S.
266,274 (2002). It has, however, been described extensively in cases analyzing the
required level of suspicion to justify a temporary detention to investigate criminal
activity—i.e., a Terry stop. In that context, officers need only have a "reasonable,
6

articulable suspicion" that the person is engaged in criminal activity. See State v.
Markland, 2005 UT 26, \ 10,112 P.3d 507 (citations and quotations omitted). The
belief "need not rise to the level required for probable cause, and it falls
considerably short of satisfying a preponderance of the evidence standard." Arvizu,
534 U.S. at 274. It is, other words, the lowest standard of suspicion in criminal law,
short of a hunch.
While the suspicion must be articulable, reasonable belief does not involve
precise analysis or rigorous proof. It is a "commonsense, nontechnical" standard
meant to apply to "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which
reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690,695 (1996) (citations and quotations omitted). In other words, reasonable
belief is a fluid concept, not a finely-tuned standard, that is "not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules." Id. at 695-96 (citations and quotations
omitted).
Applying that standard to the question of exigency, officers need not be
certain that the evidence will be destroyed or that a warrant cannot be timely
obtained. They need only have a "reasonable, articulable suspicion" that the
evidence might be destroyed. Markland, 2005 UT 26, % 10 (citation and quotations
omitted). Police need not precisely calculate the time needed to prepare a warrant
or to obtain a telephonic warrant. It is enough that they articulate a reasonable
7

belief, based in the facts, that during the time they are seeking a warrant, the
evidence might be destroyed.
Such a belief is present when officers know that they have already lost some
evidence and that while they are seeking a warrant they will continue to lose
evidence. That was the case here, where officers knew that they had already lost
evidence while they responded to the scene, investigated the accident, interviewed
witnesses, and determined that the driver was intoxicated and likely guilty of
automobile homicide.2 Officers knew that if they sought a warrant, the evidence
would continue to be destroyed. Under such circumstances, they reasonably
believed that the delay to obtain a warrant "threatened the destruction of evidence."
Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 (quotations and citations omitted).

2

Thus, it was

At oral argument, counsel for the State asserted that police did not have
probable cause to draw defendant's blood until Officer Swenson located defendant
at LDS hospital and saw that she was obviously intoxicated. Upon further review of
the record, it appears that the officers investigating the accident had probable cause
once they interviewed defendant's boyfriend at the scene of the accident and
learned that the driver had been drinking before the accident at a nearby bar (R.
560:8). The timing of the probable cause determination does not change the
outcome in this case, however, because officers still had a reasonable belief that the
delay to obtain a warrant threatened the destruction of evidence. Cf. Cardwell v.
Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 595-96 (holding that automobile exception to warrant
requirement is not inapplicable merely because police had probable cause and could
have sought a warrant well before automobile was discovered and seized).
8

reasonable to obtain a sample of defendant's blood without delay to obtain a
warrant.
B.

The State's interest in obtaining a sample of defendant's blood
outweighs her privacy interest.
Even where police reasonably believe that the delay to obtain a warrant

threatens the destruction of evidence, the Supreme Court has held the search
unreasonable where the suspect's Fourth Amendment interest outweighed the
State's interest in obtaining the evidence. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 763; Welsh, 466
U.S. at 753-54. For example, in Welsh, officers had probable cause to believe that
Welsh was guilty of driving while intoxicated. See Welsh, 466 U.S. at 753. They
located him at home and arrested him in his bedroom without a warrant. Id. The
Supreme Court held that the home intrusion was unreasonable. Id. at 754. It
reasoned that while officers were faced with an emergency circumstance—the
dissipation of Welsh's blood-alcohol level—the State did not have a strong enough
interest in the evidence to justify an intrusion into Welsh's home. Id. The Court
explained that in Wisconsin, a first offense for driving under the influence was a
nonjailable civil forfeiture offense. Id. It held that "application of the exigentcircumstances exception in the context of a home entry should rarely be sanctioned
when there is probable cause to believe that only a minor offense, such as the kind at
issue in [Welsh], has been committed." Id. at 753.

9

Thus, under Welsh, "an important factor to be considered when determining
whether any exigency exists is the gravity of the underlying offense for which the
arrest is being made." Id. at 753. In fact, the penalty that attaches to an offense is
"the clearest and most consistent indication of the State's interest in arresting
individuals suspected of committing that offense." Id. at 754 n.14; see also McArihur,
531 U.S. at 336.
The Supreme Court has also looked at the importance of the evidence to the
State in proving its case. See Winston, 470 U.S. at 765. While it is difficult to make
"determinations in advance as to the strength of the case," evidence that appears at
the time of the search to be of minimal probative value may not justify an intrusion.
Id. For example, in Winston, the Commonwealth of Virginia sought a warrant to
compel Winston to undergo surgery to remove a bullet that was fired into his
shoulder by the robbery victim. Id. at 755-56. The Court held that the intrusion into
Winston's privacy was "severe" as it involved an almost "total divestment of
[Winston]'s ordinary control over surgical probing beneath his skin." Id. at 765-66.
The court then considered the Commonwealth's interest in the evidence. Id. at 765
It determined that the Commonwealth had "substantial additional evidence" that
Winston had tried to rob the victim. Id. at 766 It concluded therefore that the
surgery would be unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment Id. The Court
explained that the operation would "intrude substantially on [Winston]'s protected
10

interests" and that the Commonwealth had "failed to demonstrate a compelling
need for it." Id. at 766.
On the opposite side of the scale, the Court looks at the nature of the intrusion
to determine the weight of the suspect's Fourth Amendment interests. A suspect's
Fourth Amendment interests, and hence his Fourth Amendment protections, vary
based on the nature of the intrusion and the expectation of privacy. See Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,9 (1967) ("Of course, the specific content and incidents of [a Fourth
Amendment] right must be shaped by the context in which it is asserted."). While a
suspect's privacy interest in his home is great, see Welsh, 466 U.S. at 750, his privacy
interest in his automobile is less. See Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974).
Similarly, a surgical procedure may be unreasonable even with a warrant, see
Winston, 470 U.S. at 766, while a blood draw is recognized as a minimal intrusion,
see Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771.
In the instant case, the State's interest in obtaining the evidence outweighs
defendant's privacy interests. Automobile homicide is a second or third degree
felony, depending on the level of negligence, punishable by up to fifteen years in
prison. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207 (1999). As explained in point B.3 of the
State's Brief of Petitioner, the State has a substantial interest in the safety of its
highways and in prosecuting alcohol related traffic offenses.

11

Additionally, defendant's blood-alcohol level was a critical piece of the State's
case. Automobile homicide requires the State to prove that defendant has "a blood
alcohol content of .08% or greater by weight/ 7 Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207(l)(a). Id.
The percentage weight of alcohol in the blood stream can only be proven by a test
such as a blood draw or a breathalyzer. Without a test, the State can only prove
automobile homicide by showing that defendant was under the influence of alcohol
"to a degree that renders [her] incapable of safely operating a vehicle/' Utah Code
Ann. § 76-5-207(1)(a), a much more difficult element to prove. 3
On the other hand, the intrusion on defendant's privacy interest was minimal.
As explained in point B.2, a blood draw is, relative to other Fourth Amendment
interests, a minimal intrusion. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771. The intrusion was
particularly slight in this case, where the draw was taken from an existing IV line (R.
560:25,58). The State did not even need to probe beneath defendant's skin.
To summarize, an exigency justified the warrantless blood draw here because
officers had a reasonable basis to believe that the delay to obtain a warrant
threatened the destruction of evidence. They had already lost some evidence during
the time they spent investigating the accident, and they would continue to lose

3

The Legislature amended the automobile homicide statute in 2002, before
the instant crime occurred, to track the requirements of Utah's drunk driving
statute. See 2002 Utah Laws 355.
12

evidence while they sought a warrant. In addition, defendant's blood sample was a
critical component of a felony homicide prosecution and was drawn without even
breaking the surface of defendant's skin.
The court of appeals erred by disregarding these interests. It relied instead on
the officers' subjective motivations and their failure to calculate the time required to
obtain a warrant. But the basis for believing an exigency exists need only be
reasonable, not probable or more likely than not. Given the substantial interest of
the state in the evidence, the minimal intrusion on defendant's privacy, and the
threat of destruction of the evidence, the blood draw in this case was reasonable.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests the Court to reverse
the judgment of the court of appeals.
Respectfully submitted October 6,2006.
MARKL.SHURTLEFF
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

/l4s?bS=^—
MATTHEW D. BATES
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 6,2006,1 served two copies of the foregoing
Brief of Petitioner by first-class mail upon the following people:
Lori J. Seppi
Salt Lake Legal Defender Assoc.
424 East 500 South, Suite 310
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Janice Frost
Counsel for Amici
220 East Morris Avenue, 2nd Floor
South Salt Lake, Utah 84115
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Addendum A
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

]
>

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

J1

-vs-

Case No. 011907005
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs

HEATHER RODRIGUEZ
Defendant.

Defendant's Motion to Suppress Evidence having come before this Court for
hearing in the above entitled manner on October 12, 2001, in which Defendant was
represented by counsel, Shannon Romero, and the State was represented by counsel,
Michael E. Postma, the Court having heard evidence and having considered oral
arguments of counsel, the Court now enters the following Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On May 9, 2001, the defendant was driving an Isuzu Trooper southbound on
State Street and approximately 1700 South in Salt Lake County. Terry Lee
Stewart was a passenger in the Trooper.

3ol

2.

The defendant made a left hand turn into the path of an oncoming school bus.
The school bus struck the Trooper on the passenger side and critically injured
the passenger, Ms. Stewart.

3.

Salt Lake City Police Officers and emergency personnel responded to the
scene of the collision. Emergency personnel removed the defendant from the
driver's seat. Emergency personnel informed the officers on the scene that the
passenger of the vehicle was in critical condition. Emergency personnel also
informed the officers on the scene that the defendant smelled of alcohol.

4.

Defendant Rodriguez was transported by ambulance to L.D.S. Hospital. Terry
Lee Stewart was transported by ambulance to University Hospital.

5.

Officer Peterson located a partially consumed bottle of Rothchild's vodka in a
purse in the Trooper. The bottle of vodka was approximately three-quarters
full. Terry Lee Stewart's identification was located in the purse.

6.

Officer Swenson was dispatched to observe the defendant's blood being
drawn. Officer Swenson first went to University Hospital where Ms. Stewart
was being treated and learned she was not expected to live.

7.

Officer Swenson then went to L.D S. Hospital where the defendant was being
treated. Officer Swenson observed that the defendant smelled very heavily of
alcohol, and when she spoke her speech was very slow and slurry. The
defendant's eyes were red and bloodshot and she was uncooperative.

8.

Officer Swenson was unaware how long the defendant had been in the
hospital He was also unaware of any medications that the defendant may
have received or her medical evaluations.

9.

Officer Swenson told the defendant that her blood was being drawn because
of the traffic accident. The defendant did not respond to Officer Swenson.
The defendant did not object to her blood being drawn.

10.

Officer Swenson observed Brian Davis, a blood technician, draw blood from
the defendant using an existing IV line, which had previously been inserted by
medical personnel to treat the defendant following the collision.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The admissibility of the blood draw is governed by Utah Code § 76-5-207(6).
2. Officers had probable cause to believe that a serious crime had been committed.
Officers were aware of the serious nature of the collision, and the fact that the
passenger of the vehicle was not expected to live. Officers also had probable
cause to believe that the defendant was intoxicated at the time of the collision.
3. Exigent circumstances existed because the dissipation of alcohol in the blood is
sufficient to create an exigent circumstance.
4. Information known to the officers investigating the scene of the accident was
deemed to be known by Officer Swenson.
5. Because of the exigent circumstances and the probable cause that a serious
offense occurred, there was no need to get a warrant, telephonic or otherwise, to
draw the defendant's blood. Additionally, no arrest was necessary to draw the
defendant's blood.
6. Negligently operating a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol, which
results in the death of another is a felony, and is a serious offense.

7. Drawing blood from an existing IV line was non-intrusive because it was already
in the defendant's body for medical purposes. The defendant's blood was drawn
in a manner that does not shock the conscience.
8. The police conduct was reasonable in light of all of the circumstances.
9. The admissibility of the blood evidence is not prohibited by the Rules of Evidence
or the constitution.

DATED this _ ^ day ofMafSHT2002.
^f

BY THE COURT:'

lonorable Dennis M. Fuchs - \

APPROVED AS TO FORM:

iikAs
haraion Romero

^

\

^

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 28 day of March, 2002, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was delivered to:
SHANNON ROMERO
Attorney for defendant, heather Rodriguez
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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DAVID E. YOCOM
District Attorney for Salt Lake County
MICHAEL E. POSTMA, Bar. No. 6313
Deputy District Attorney
231 East 400 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 363-7900
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO SUPRESS

-vsHEATHER RODRIGUEZ,

Case No. 011907005 FS
Defendant.
Judge Dennis M. Fuchs

Based upon the foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT and CONCLUSIONS OF LAW,
and for good cause, the Defendant's Motion to Suppress Blood Evidence is denied.

Dated this

J/ day Qf-Marcn", 2002.
BY THE COURT.:

Honorable Dennis ML Fuch^;

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that on the 28th day of March, 2002, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS was
delivered to:
SHANNON ROMERO
Attorney for defendant, Heather Rodriguez
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, UT 84U1

Addendum B
(Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-207)

76-5-207

UTAH CRIMINAL CODE

where homicide was result of automobile accident, whether defendant kept proper lookout
and observed course his automobile was taking
so as to avoid collision was a question for the
jury. State v. Lake, 57 Utah 619, 196 P. 1015
(1921).
In involuntary manslaughter prosecution
arising out of automobile accident, jury could
have found that, by reason of defendant's intoxicated condition, he had failed to react in
normal manner to situation which confronted
him, and that his conduct was responsible
cause of collision and resulting death. State v.
McQuilkin, 113 Utah 268, 193 R2d 433 (1948).
Conflicting evidence as to defendant's negligence presented jury question, unless reasonable minds could have arrived at no conclusion
other than that there was no criminal negligence. State v. Read, 121 Utah 453, 243 P.2d
439 (1953).
Manslaughter.
—Negligent homicide as included offense.
Negligent homicide is an included offense
under a charge of manslaughter. State v. Dyer,
671 P.2d 142 (Utah 1983).
There was no rational basis for a verdict
acquitting the defendant of manslaughter and
convicting him of negligent homicide, when the
only issue relevant to the choice was defendant's awareness of the risk of death, and any
absence of awareness could only have been due

to voluntary intoxication, making unawareness
immaterial under § 76-2-306. State v. Day, 815
P2d 1345 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
Negligence.
Mere negligence was not sufficient to authorize verdict of manslaughter. State v. Adamson,
101 Utah 534, 125 P.2d 429 (1942).
Pleas and defenses.
Acquittal under former § 57-7-102 for failure
to report automobile accident was not bar to
prosecution for manslaughter. State v. Cheeseman, 63 Utah 138, 223 P. 762 (1924).
Self-defense.
—Burden of proof.
The state was not required to prove the
absence of self-defense as one of the elements of
its cause of action. State v. Strieby, 790 P.2d 98
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
—Evidence sufficient.
A conviction of manslaughter, after a bench
trial, was contrary to the clear weight of the
evidence, where defendant fatally shot her husband after his violent physical attack, coupled
with his threats to kill her, led her to believe
that she was in immediate danger of serious
injury or death. State v. Strieby, 790 R2d 98
(Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Cited in State v. Mincy, 838 P.2d 648 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 40 Am. Jur. 2d Homicide |
61, 84 et seq.

C.J.S. — 40 C.J.S. Homicide §§ 93, 94.

76-5-207. Automobile homicide.
(1) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a third degree felony, if
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the
death of another by operating the vehicle in a negligent manner.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "negligent" means simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of care that reasonable and
prudent persons exercise under like or similar circumstances.
(2) (a) Criminal homicide is automobile homicide, a second degree felony, if
the actor operates a motor vehicle while having a blood alcohol content of
.08% or greater by weight, or while under the influence of alcohol, any
drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug, to a degree that
renders the actor incapable of safely operating the vehicle, and causes the
death of another by operating the motor vehicle in a criminally negligent
manner.
(b) For the purpose of this subsection, "criminally negligent" means
criminal negligence as defined by Subsection 76-2-103(4).
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(3) The standards for chemical breath analysis as provided by Section
41-6-44.3 and the provisions for the admissibility of chemical test results as
provided by Section 41-6-44.5 apply to determination and proof of blood alcohol
content under this section.
(4) Percent by weight of alcohol in the blood is based upon grams of alcohol
per one hundred cubic centimeters of blood.
(5) The fact that a person charged with violating this section is on or has
been legally entitled to use alcohol or a drug is not a defense to any charge of
violating this section.
(6) Evidence of a defendant's blood or breath alcohol content or drug content
is admissible except when prohibited by Rules of Evidence or the constitution.
(7) For purposes of this section, "motor vehicle" means any self-propelled
vehicle and includes any automobile, truck, van, motorcycle, train, engine,
watercraft, or aircraft.
History: C. 1953, 76-5-207, enacted by L.
1985 (1st S.S.), ch. 1, § 1; 1988, ch. 148, § 2;
1993, ch. 161, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws 1985
(lst S.S.), ch. 1, § 1 repealed former § 76-5-

207, as last amended by L. 1983, ch. 99, § 20,
relating to automobile homicide, and enacted
present § 76-5-207.
Cross-References. — Jurisdiction of juvenile court, § 78-3a-16.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
where defendant was driving on wrong side of
street when he collided head-on with car in
which the decedent was riding, and woman who
proved to be the deceased was observed to be
bleeding and was pronounced dead on arrival
at the hospital, corpus delicti was proven. State
v. Romero, 12 Utah 2d 210, 364 P.2d 828 (1961).

ANALYSIS

Constitutionality.
Causation.
Corpus delicti.
Death of another.
Double jeopardy.
Evidence.
—Insufficient.
—Sufficient.
Negligent homicide.
Proof of corpus delicti.
Constitutionality.
Former § 76-30-7.4, which described automobile homicide, was not unconstitutional on
grounds that it substituted status of being
under influence of drugs or liquor for criminal
intent. State v. Twitchell, 8 Utah 2d 314, 333
R2d 1075 (1959).
Causation.
In prosecution of driver involved in intersection collision charged with automobile homicide, jury was not required to find defendant to
be sole proximate cause of death before handing down guilty verdict, and court was not
required to give jury instruction on superseding
intervening cause, since any negligence on part
of other driver could only have been concurrent
cause. State v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376 (Utah
1983).
Corpus delicti.
In prosecution for automobile homicide,

Death of another.
Term "death of another" does not include the
death of an unborn fetus, and person causing
death of unborn fetus by negligent operation of
an automobile does not commit automobile homicide. State v. Larsen, 578 P.2d 1280 (Utah
1978).
Double jeopardy.
Conviction of motorist for speeding or reckless driving did not bar subsequent prosecution
for involuntary manslaughter. State v. Empey,
65 Utah 609, 239 P. 25, 44 A.L.R. 558 (1925);
State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 63, 157 P.2d 258
(1945).
Where defendant was charged originally
with negligent homicide under former § 41-643.10, and after preliminary hearing the charge
was dismissed and he was charged, tried, and
convicted of automobile homicide, he had not
been placed twice in jeopardy by having been
tried for automobile homicide after dismissal of
original charge. State v. Romero, 12 Utah 2d
210, 364 P.2d 828 (1961).
Evidence.
Negligibly gruesome photographs merely
showing that a severe accident occurred and
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